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1. Introduction 
Graham and Harvey (2001) surveyed 392 CEOs and found that two-thirds of them regarded 
market timing as an important factor in financing decisions. Variety of other studies like Alti, 
(2006) and Baker and Wurgler (2007), show that corporate market timing is an important 
factor in equity issues. While the market timing effect in equity issues is widely recognized, 
there is no mutual understanding on how to define market timing. Previous literature has 
defined market timing based on the level of underpricing (Ritter 1984), investment sentiment 
index (Baker and Wurgler 2007) and the number of IPOs in a given time period (Liang 2004) 
and (Alti 2006). One common finding in many of these studies is, that timing equity issues, 
especially IPOs, is mainly a byproduct of market conditions rather than firms’ need for capital. 
A variety of studies are also conducted about the differences between firms that time their 
equity issues and those that do not. Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that hot markets attract 
firms that might find it difficult to go public during a cold market. Rajan and Servaes (1997) 
find that firms with high analyst growth projections underperform their benchmark firms 
while firms with the lowest analyst growth projections outperform these benchmark firms. 
They also find that this effect only increases with longer time period, which might in part 
explain the significant long-term underperformance of hot IPO firms. These studies are 
consistent with the widespread findings of inferior quality of hot market listers, measured in 
terms of post-IPO performance as found in studies like Chang et al. (2013) and Loughran and 
Ritter (1997).  
Past studies have had very different measurements of market timing as well as findings on 
the persistence of timing attempts on capital structure. Alti (2006) used monthly IPO volume 
while Baker and Wurgler (2002) used historical market to book ratio as a basis of defining 
market timing. These two papers also found contrary results while using the same sample 
period. Alti (2006) found very little persistence on the effect of market timing, but Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) found that the timing effect on capital structure persisted beyond ten years.  
To my knowledge, there are no studies on the subject with a recent data. As the data used by 
both Alti (2006) and Baker and Wurgler (2002) end at 1999. Even the data used by Chang. et 
al. (2013) is only up to 2005, which does not include the significant increase in the number of 
IPO leading to the 2008 financial crisis and the following period of low IPO volume. The 
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purpose of this thesis is therefore to measure how persistence the effect of market timing on 
capital structure is and how has it changed from the more researched 1971-1999 period to 
2000-2015 period. I use similar methods than Alti (2006) and complement his findings by 
more than doubling the sample size and increasing the time period significantly. 
I find major differences between the two sample periods. First, hot market firms raise more 
proceeds than cold market firms and decrease their leverage more, but the difference 
between hot and cold market firms has decreased from the 1971-1999 sample to 2000-2015 
sample. Second, contrary to the findings of Alti (2006), but in similar for those of Baker and 
Wurgler (2007) I find that the effect of market timing had persistent effect on capital structure 
during the sample consisting IPOs between 1971-1999. However, I find that the effect had 
very little persistence during the more recent sample of firms going public during 2000-2015. 
Furthermore, I find that the pure market timing effect, defined by regression coefficient 
measuring hot and cold markets, had almost no impact on the result during 2000-2015 sample 
while it was a significant contributor between the differences on hot and cold market firms in 
1971-1999 sample as found in Alti (2006). 
The remaining paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents literature review on market 
timing and its effect on capital structure and describes the research hypothesis. Section 3 
presents the data and defines the measurement of market timing. Section 4. Includes the 
findings about issuance activity between hot and cold market firms, short term effect of 
market timing on capital structure and how persistent the effect is. Section 5. Presents further 
findings IPO proceeds and firm leverage based on pre-IPO sales and leverage. Section 6 
concludes the findings. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Literature review 
A study of the efficient and integrated capital markets by Modigliani and Miller (1958), find 
that the costs of different forms of capital do not vary independently. This means that there 
is no gain from opportunistically changing between equity and debt as cited in Baker and 
Wurgler (2002). However, several studies show the existence of market timing, which in 
efficient capital markets would draw no benefits.  
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Baker and Wurgler (2002) find several different kinds of studies that offers a strong support 
for the existence of market timing effect. First are studies that observe market timing based 
on the actual financing decisions. They find that firms tend to issue more equity when they 
can get it is at a lower cost. Second are studies based on long-term stock market return. They 
concluded that firms on average sell equity when valuations are relatively high and 
repurchase it when valuations are relatively low. Third are studies that found firms issuing 
more equity when investors are optimistic about firms’ earning forecasts, which is also found 
in Rajan and Servaes (1997). 
Other studies try to explain the reasons for the fluctuation of the number of IPOs. Allen and 
Gaulhaber (1989) claim that underpricing has a signaling role for other high-quality firms to 
go public as they can reduce the adverse selection problem. On the other hand, Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) claim that high number of IPOs draw weaker firms into going public as they 
might find it hard to go public during a cold IPO market. According to Chang. et al. (2013) the 
previous finding of weaker firms entering the IPO markets when they see many other firms 
going public divides firms going public as “pioneers” and “followers” based on how early 
during the hot IPO market they list their shares. They find that these “followers” are the main 
reason we see hot market firms with worse long-run performance after the IPO than cold 
market firms. Chemmanur and He (2011) explain the clustering of IPOs based on product 
market competition. Their model suggests that even firms with enough cash holdings might 
find it worth to go public if their competitors do. Market conditions clearly have a significant 
effect on IPOs clustering into a waves of high and low IPO volume. 
The same paper where Graham and Harvey (2001) found CEOs considering equity timing to 
an important factor in financing decisions they surveyed CEOs and found that only 10% on 
responder firms had a strict target leverage. 37% of their respondent firms had a flexible 
target leverage ratio and 34% had a somewhat tight target or range for leverage. In addition 
to all other studies, these responses concerning target capital structure suggest that market 
timing attempts are more important than specific capital structure, at least in a short time 
period. 
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2.2 Hypotheses 
By following the methods used in Alti (2006) to research how persistent the market timings’ 
effect on capital structure is and then research how it has changes over time by comparing 
two samples containing firms listing during 1971-1999 and 2000-2015 time periods. I have 
two main hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1:  
I expect that otherwise similar firms to raise more proceeds when listing in times of hot IPO 
markets than cold markets.  
Hypothesis 2: 
If hot market firms raise more capital than cold market firms, hot market firms should 
decrease their leverage ratios more than cold market firms do. Therefore, market timing 
would have an effect on firms’ capital structures.  
The rationale for my first and second hypotheses is the following. If firms see hot IPO markets 
as a window of opportunity to go public with temporarily low costs of equity as pointed in Alti 
(2006), otherwise similar firms should raise more proceeds than cold market firms as cold 
market firms want to sell as little equity as possible when there is a relatively high cost to it. 
Because hot markets firms would then increase their capital more than they would need for 
their operations, I assume that they are likely to use more proceeds to decrease their leverage 
and therefore affecting their capital structure more than cold market firms. 
The research question then is that how persistent this effect on capital structure is, and how 
it has changed from 1971-1999 to 2000-2015. 
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3. Data and definition of market timing 
3.1 Data  
Table 1 reports variable means and standard deviations for firm characteristics. The data is 
gathered by starting with a sample consisting of all North American IPOs reported by SDC 
Platinum. I exclude spinoffs, unit offers and financials firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 
6999 as in Alti (2006) and Baker and Wurgler (2002). This leaves a sample of 10876 IPOs. I link 
the SDC data to CRSP data using historical CUSIP numbers and get CRSP PERMCO number for 
all the firms. I then use CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database to get COMPUSTAT GVKEY for 
all the firms and use that to get COMPUSTAT financials for all firms. I then select firms that 
have pre-IPO financials and IPO year-end total assets of over $10m in COMPUSTAT.1 That 
leaves a sample of 5255 IPOs and firm financials for pre-IPO and IPO year.  
Information for issue date, total proceeds, primary proceeds, SIC codes and offer price come 
from SDC while other firm figures come from COMPUSTAT. COMPUSTAT firm characteristics 
are defined as follows2: Total Assets, A, is COMPUSTAT annual item 6. Book Debt, D, is total 
liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 10), minus deferred taxes (item 35). Preferred 
stock is replaced by preferred stock redemption value when missing (item 56). Book Equity, 
E, is total assets (item 6) minus book debt. Market value, M, is market value of equity plus 
book debt, where market value of equity is calculated as year-end share price (item 24) 
multiplied by the number of outstanding shares (item 25). Book value, B, is the same as total 
assets. The variable SIZE is natural logarithm from net sales (item 12). Variables new debt 
issues, d, and new equity issues are calculated by the change in book debt divided by total 
assets and change in book equity divided by total assets respectively. EBITDA/A is earnings 
before interest, taxes and depreciation divided by total assets. PPE/A is net plant, property 
and equipment. R&D/A is research and development cost. INV/A is capital expenditures. 
DIV/E is common dividend divided by book equity and CASH/A is cash and short-term 
investments. 
 
1 This requires pre-IPO financials that might cause selection bias. However, most of the firms in the sample did 
have pre-IPO financials like in Alti (2006) 
2 Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Alti (2006) used similar definitions for firm characteristics  
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All variables except M/B and SIZE are reported in percentage terms. Values of e/A, d/A, 
ΔRE/A, EBITDA/A, INV/A and DIV/E are dropped out if the absolute value exceeds 100%. In 
subsequent regressions these values are replaced by 100% and -100% respectively. 
I find that leverage decreases significantly during the IPO year which is expected as firms raise 
significant amount of equity from their IPO. Profitability decreases substantially after the IPO 
which is also documented by Mikkelson. Et al. (1997) and Alti (2006). Cash compared to assets 
also increases substantially in the IPO year and decreases steadily to pre-IPO levels a few years 
after the IPO. Size increases steadily every year after the IPO.3 
 
3.2 Definition of market timing 
Other literature has used many different methods for defining market timing, but the 
common problem for many of them is that are likely to pick some other determinants of 
issuing activity. For example, using market to book ratio as a proxy for market timing it is likely 
to be affected by growth prospects of firms as fast growing firms tend to have high market to 
book ratio and more need for capital.  Stock return-based market timing measures on the 
other hand require historical data on stock market returns. To eliminate the concerns 
mentioned above, I use a simple market timing definition based on monthly IPO volume as 
used in (Liang 2004) and Alti (2006). I focus on the initial public offering as the financing event 
for various reasons. First, it is easily the most important financing decision a firm will make. 
Second, it is a one-time event which has a significant effect on capital structure. This makes 
is relatively easy to compare capital structure before and after the IPO. Thirdly, it has the most 
asymmetric information between management and investors which leads to greatest changes 
of misvaluation, which is a major reason for market timing attempts as stated by Alti (2006).  
I use the sample of firms that have pre-IPO COMPUSTAT financials and total assets over $10m 
at the end of the IPO year. To smooth out monthly variation I use a 3-month centered moving 
average as the number of IPOs as in Helwege and Liang (2004) and Alti (2006). Results are 
reported in figure 1. I define hot IPO markets as those months that experience more than the 
median number of IPOs. Since the median number of IPOs during subsample of 1971-1999 
 
3 I do not consider firms exiting COMPUSTAT in any way which might make some result biased 
10 
 
and 2000-2015 are so close to each other (6,5 vs 7), I use the median number of IPOs for the 
whole sample period (6,67) as the measurement of hot and cold IPO months. Market timer 
firms are then defined as those that go public during a hot IPO month. For all the following 
regressions the variable HOT gets a value of one when the firms went public during a hot 
market and value zero otherwise. From the sample of 5225 IPOs, 4606 (88%) occurred during 
hot market and 619 (12%) during cold market.  
While the median number of monthly IPOs during 1971-1999 and 2000-2015 is relatively 
similar, there is significant difference between how much is has fluctuated during these 
sample periods. This might have an effect to the results concerning market timing effect.
  
 
 
Figure 1: Centered 3-month moving average on the number of IPOs 
Horizontal line is the monthly median. 
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4. Market timing and impact on capital structure 
4.1 Market timing and IPO proceeds 
Hot IPO markets have better conditions for listings than cold IPO markets because the cost of 
equity and cost of adverse selection among other factors are more favorable. This will lead to 
more IPOs and more IPO proceeds during hot market times than during cold market times. I 
examine this hypothesis by comparing the mean values for hot and cold market IPO proceeds 
and other relevant known determinants of issuance activity. I capture the market timing 
effect by measuring how hot and cold market firms differ in terms of equity issues and how 
much of an effect does pure market timing have in it. I measure the effect of pure market 
timing as coefficient value for hot market dummy in the regressions. 
Table 2 panel A includes mean values among hot and cold market firms. Panel B includes 
regression analysis, where the dependent variable 𝑌𝑡 is total proceeds divided by IPO year-
end assets, primary proceeds divided by IPO year-end assets, primary proceeds divided by 
pre-IPO assets, share of primary shares issued, offer price divided by book value of assets and 
new debt issues divided at the IPO year assets. Regression form is as follows: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑥0 +  𝑥1𝐻𝑂𝑇 + 𝑥2𝑀 𝐵𝑡⁄ + 𝑥3𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝐴𝑡−1⁄ + 𝑥4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝑥5𝑃𝑃𝐸 𝐴𝑡−1⁄
+ 𝑥6𝑅&𝐷 𝐴𝑡−1 +⁄ 𝑥7𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡−1 𝑥6 + 𝐷 𝐴𝑡−1 +⁄ 𝜀 
 
I use the same regression coefficients as Alti (2006) which are dummy variable hot, which 
measures market timing attempts, market to book ratio, lagged profitability, lagged size 
variable, lagged plant, property and equipment variable, research and development variable, 
RDD dummy which takes the value of one if research and development is not reported and 
lagged book leverage. He finds that previous research recognizes these factors as the key 
determinants of financing policy (Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995)). 
Hot market firms raise on average more proceeds than cold IPO firms. The difference between 
these two is 26% primary proceeds and 19,5% for total proceeds when compared to IPO year 
end assets. This difference in primary proceeds increases to 53% when comparing to pre-IPO 
assets, since IPO year assets already include the proceeds received from the IPO.  
Despite these differences being significant in the whole sample as well as in the two 
subsamples, I find some notable differences between equity issuance between the two 
12 
 
subsamples. First, the amount of capital raised in the IPO has increased for both hot and cold 
market IPOs in the 00-15 sample period, but the difference between the amount of proceeds 
has decreased substantially when comparing to the sample consisting of 1971-1999 IPOs. Hot 
market firms raised 51 percent more primary proceeds to IPO-year end assets compared to 
cold market firms in 1971-1999 period and only 16 percent more in the 2000-2015 sample 
period. Regression analysis in panel B shows that the effect of market timing, measured by 
the value of the variable hot, was almost identical with the differences between hot and cold 
market IPO proceeds. Looking at the more recent sample of IPOs, the effect on pure market 
timing has almost vanished. 
The differences between other measurements of issuance activity between hot and cold 
market firms, such as the proportion of shares sold at the IPO and offer to book value, have 
declined significantly. 
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 Interestingly though, despites the difference between hot and cold markets firms’ offer to 
book ratios declining, the effect of market timing is significant determinant. Other interesting 
observation is that hot market firms in the older sample decreased their leverage while cold 
market firms increased it during the IPO year. The differences in IPO year debt issues show 
no difference in the more recent sample and all the firms seem to decrease their leverages 
with a considerable amount during the IPO year. I suspect this is linked to the earlier 
observations that both hot and cold market firms raise more capital in the more recent 
sample compared to older sample. The portion of shares issued compared to outstanding 
share has also decreased from significant differences in the older sample to almost 
nonexistent in the more recent sample. 
 
4.2 Comparison of hot and cold market firms 
Table 3 shows that pre-IPO leverage for hot market firms was significantly more than those 
for cold market firms during the 1971-1999 sample, but the difference is nonexistent in the 
2000-2015 sample. According to the regression analysis in panel B over half of the differences 
between pre-IPO leverages were because by the hot variable in the 71-99 sample. Differences 
in capital expenditures experience the same effect, which is that the 71-99 sample shows hot 
market firms spending less on capital expenditures, but the 00-15 sample shows equal 
amount of capital expenditures. This effect persists at least two years after the IPO.   
EBITDA divided by total assets show persistently that hot market firms are less profitable than 
cold market firms. This is in line with other literature like Chemmanur and He (2011) that 
found hot market listers having lower post-IPO profitability than firms listing their shares 
during cold IPO market. Part of the reason might be because hot market firms have larger 
asset bases at the end of IPO year as suggested by Alti (2006), but the effect is large enough 
to not have been caused by this effect. The effect is present in the whole sample period as 
well as in both subsamples. Hot market effect seems to be a big reason for this effect as it 
contributes approximately half of the difference up to two years after the IPO. IPO year 
dividend payout is larger in hot market firms, but this difference is not statistically significant. 
Further examination which is not reported shows the same results for the years IPO + 1 and 
IPO + 2 for both subsamples. 
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4.3 Short term market timing effect on capital structure 
Panel A reports mean values for hot and cold market firms and the t-value of their difference. All 
values are reported in percentage terms. Panel B reports regressions for the whole sample period as 
well as subsamples 1971-1999 and 2000-2015. Regression form is as follows: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑥0 +  𝑥1𝐻𝑂𝑇 + 𝑥2𝑀 𝐵𝑡⁄ + 𝑥3𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝐴𝑡−1⁄ + 𝑥4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝑥5𝑃𝑃𝐸 𝐴𝑡−1⁄
+ 𝑥6𝑅&𝐷 𝐴𝑡−1 +⁄ 𝑥7𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡−1 𝑥6 + 𝐷 𝐴𝑡−1 +⁄ 𝜀 
The dependent variables, 𝑌𝑡, Change in leverage, new equity issuance divided by year-end total assets, 
change in cash divided by year-end total assets, change retained earnings divided by year-end total 
assets and year-end leverage. 
 
Table 4: Short-term market timing effect 
 
Table 4 shows that leverage ratios at the end of IPO year of hot market firms are less than 
their cold market counterparts. The difference is over 10% and is almost identical in both 
subsamples. This is consistent with the results on table 2 that hot market firms raise more 
capital in their IPOs.  
Despite the differences in book leverages between hot and cold market firms being almost 
equal in both subsamples it must be noted that pre-IPO leverage was larger in hot market 
firms for 71-99 period whereas it was the same in 00-15 period. The difference between hot 
71-15 71-99 00-15 71-15 71-99 00-15 71-15 71-99 00-15 71-15 71-99 00-15 71-15 71-99 00-15
HOT -49,35 -44,31 -63,45 41,02 41,97 36,40 28,58 26,11 35,47 4,72 4,72 4,76 37,43 38,44 34,49
COLD -42,02 -24,51 -58,34 33,91 32,44 36,58 21,80 14,47 28,57 7,10 7,85 4,08 41,12 42,77 39,17
t-value -4,03 -10,08 -1,98 5,24 6,40 -0,06 5,92 9,17 3,69 -4,75 -6,18 0,49 -3,67 -3,63 -2,71
HOT -1,38 -7,70 1,40 5,21 10,70 -3,18 2,58 6,35 -3,18 -2,54 -2,75 0,65 -3,68 -7,38 -1,05
-1,38 -5,67 0,87 4,54 8,06 -1,12 2,83 5,14 -1,12 -4,08 -3,90 0,36 -4,05 -6,06 -0,68
M/Bt -2,45 -2,88 -1,60 4,10 4,39 2,15 3,20 3,18 2,15 0,25 0,31 -0,18 -2,00 -2,52 -0,77
-15,48 -15,54 -4,96 18,65 18,78 3,20 22,07 18,78 3,20 1,79 2,08 -0,41 -13,96 -15,17 -2,51
EBITDA/At-1 6,19 3,68 1,51 11,58 12,20 26,72 -7,46 -6,19 26,72 7,99 8,29 2,00 -1,50 -2,94 -5,40
5,36 2,67 0,64 6,45 6,21 4,86 -7,06 -4,92 4,86 4,58 4,46 0,32 -1,43 -2,37 -2,38
SIZEt-1 35,41 4,07 3,16 -6,16 -6,21 -7,85 -3,68 -4,25 -7,85 -1,10 -1,32 -0,33 4,49 4,41 5,35
17,08 15,53 10,17 -25,19 -21,67 -11,60 -19,42 -17,69 -11,60 -6,51 -6,80 -0,55 23,91 18,74 13,62
PPE/At-1 5,15 1,05 -0,63 -2,86 -1,27 -1,94 -1,70 -2,70 -1,94 -2,54 -2,80 0,78 6,85 5,71 2,18
2,71 0,48 -0,88 -1,28 -0,53 -0,29 -0,97 -1,36 -0,29 -1,87 -1,92 0,16 3,97 2,94 0,53
R&D/At-1 -0,11 -0,16 -0,16 1,63 1,52 28,34 2,84 2,50 28,34 -1,91 -2,47 15,50 0,06 -0,37 0,24
-0,23 -0,26 -0,21 2,74 2,72 2,52 6,62 4,68 2,52 -0,61 -0,73 1,76 0,14 -0,69 0,32
RDDt-1 10,95 8,50 14,69 -3,21 -3,74 2,23 -7,73 -7,90 2,23 -1,34 -1,77 3,78 8,01 7,15 8,16
11,30 7,83 6,70 -2,86 -3,17 0,60 -8,68 -7,90 0,60 -1,93 -2,38 1,67 9,11 7,33 3,88
D/At-1 -101,24 -95,31 -112,50 28,10 24,54 40,52 8,10 5,71 40,52 3,59 3,45 1,47 21,52 22,89 17,62
-74,35 -61,25 -39,70 16,37 13,29 8,58 6,48 4,03 8,58 3,21 2,87 0,40 17,43 16,37 6,40
R-squared 0,643 0,647 0,639 0,320 0,332 0,347 0,300 0,322 0,347 0,066 0,079 0,505 0,245 0,260 0,217
N 4759 3447 1312 2988 2417 571 4640 3356 571 1849 1659 190 4759 3447 1312
Panel A: Mean Values
Panel B: Regression Analysis
D/At - D/At-1 e/At ΔCash/At ΔRE/At D/At
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and cold market firm IPO proceeds was smaller in the more recent sample than the sample 
from 1971 to 1999.  
The results also show that hot market firms increase their cash holdings more than cold 
market firms, which implies that hot market firms use the opportunity to raise more capital 
than they would necessarily need which is consistent with the findings of Chemmanur and He 
(2011). 
Further analyzing the data, I find that even though the results from 1971-1999 and 2000-2015 
subsamples are mostly in line with each other, the regression analysis shows that market 
timing variable has lost its significance in the more recent sample when it comes to leverage 
levels. 
 
 
4.4 Persistence of market timing effect on capital structure 
Table 4 reported that hot market firms were significantly less leveraged in the IPO year. Table 
5 panel A reports mean values for the difference between leverage in time t and pre-IPO as 
well as leverage in time t. Panel B reports regression analysis for regression of the following 
form: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑥0 +  𝑥1𝐻𝑂𝑇 + 𝑥2𝑀 𝐵𝑡⁄ + 𝑥3𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝐴𝑡−1⁄ + 𝑥4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝑥5𝑃𝑃𝐸 𝐴𝑡−1⁄
+ 𝑥6𝑅&𝐷 𝐴𝑡−1 +⁄ 𝑥7𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡−1 𝑥6 + 𝐷 𝐴𝑡−1 +⁄ 𝜀 
 
The dependent variables, 𝑌𝑡, Cumulative change in leverage from pre-IPO time and Leverage 
in time t.  
Despite only the 2000-2015 sample having equal pre-IPO leverage between hot and cold 
market firms, the leverages for hot and cold market firms converges to being equal after the 
IPO for both subsamples. This effect is persistent several years after the IPO and does not 
show signs of changing. Cumulative change from pre-IPO leverage displays the same effect 
which is that the differences between hot and cold market firms do not differ from each other 
statistically a year after the IPO, but the earlier subsample shows persistently over 15 
percentage point difference between hot and cold market firms.  
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5. Further analysis on proceeds and leverage 
As I examined the whole sample and both subsamples throughout this paper, I find it 
reasonable to do some additional tests concerning some other determinants than time 
period. Table 6 reports mean values for hot and cold market proceeds and book leverage from 
pre-IPO up to four years after the IPO as well as t-value of their difference. I also include the 
value for regression variable hot and its t-value, the R-squared for the model and number of 
observations. I get two almost equally large samples by dividing firms with pre-IPO sales of 
over and under $50m. Dividing the sample with pre-IPO leverage of under and over 50% I find 
that around 17% of the firms had pre-IPO leverage under 50% and 83% over 50%.  
From the results in table 6, I find that hot market firms with less than $50m in pre-IPO sales 
raised more than twice the amount of proceeds compared to hot IPO firms with over $50m 
in pre-IPO sales. The difference between cold market firms’ IPO proceeds with sales under 
and over $50m was much smaller but still over 50%. Smaller firms clearly raise more capital 
compared to larger firms. Pre-IPO leverage for smaller firms measured in pre-IPO sales shows 
that smaller firms’ pre-IPO leverage between hot and cold market firms differ significantly. 
Smaller firms hot market firms are much more leveraged than cold market firms while there 
is no difference between larger hot and cold market firms’ pre-IPO leverage.  
When dividing firms based on pre-IPO leverage, I see that firms with larger leverage raise 
more capital than lesser levered firms. The differences between hot and cold market firms’ 
proceeds of high levered firms smaller than those of lower levered firm’s, which suggests that 
higher levered firms need more capital regardless of market timing attempts.  
Hot market effect is strong with all results regarding IPO proceeds but shows the most effect 
in smaller and high levered firms.  
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Table 6: Further analysis on IPO proceeds and leverage 
Table 6 reports averages for hot and cold market firm variables, t-value of their difference. 
Regression variable Hot for leverage and primary proceeds regressions are also reported. All 
regressions consider the industry fixed effect defined by 3-digit SIC code. 
HOT market coefficient for a regression where the dependent variable is D/A is of the form: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑥0 +  𝑥1𝐻𝑂𝑇 + 𝑥2𝑀 𝐵𝐼𝑃𝑂⁄ + 𝑥3𝑀 𝐵𝑡−1⁄ + 𝑥4𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝐴𝑡−1⁄ + 𝑥5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1
+ 𝑥6𝑃𝑃𝐸 𝐴𝑡−1 + ⁄ + 𝑥7𝑅&𝐷 𝐴𝑡−1 +⁄ 𝑥7𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝜀 
HOT market coefficient for a regression where the dependent variable is Primary proceeds divided 
by pre-IPO assets is of the form: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑥0 +  𝑥1𝐻𝑂𝑇 + 𝑥2𝑀 𝐵𝑡⁄ + 𝑥3𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝐴𝑡−1⁄ + 𝑥4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝑥5𝑃𝑃𝐸 𝐴𝑡−1⁄
+ 𝑥6𝑅&𝐷 𝐴𝑡−1 +⁄ 𝑥7𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡−1 𝑥6 + 𝐷 𝐴𝑡−1 +⁄ 𝜀 
 
 
 
 
Pre-IPO sales under $50m Proceedsp/At-1 pre-IPO IPO IPO + 1 IPO + 2 IPO + 3 IPO + 4
HOT 236,76 79,92 28,27 32,43 36,61 40,35 41,08
COLD 154,97 71,12 35,23 36,29 39,08 39,81 43,26
t-value (difference) 7,89 4,76 -5,29 -2,79 -1,55 0,33 -1,12
HOT 43,76 — -6,70 -3,58 -4,38 -2,25 -2,44
t-value 4,70 — -4,74 -2,41 -2,61 -1,31 -1,18
R2 0,334 — 0,089 0,171 0,224 0,187 0,198
N 2294 — 2293 2251 2070 1885 1705
Pre-IPO sales over $50m
HOT 101,50 76,52 47,06 47,74 49,33 50,85 51,45
COLD 90,59 77,37 46,78 44,70 45,78 46,95 47,95
t-value (difference) 1,50 -0,04 0,19 2,21 2,41 2,55 2,08
HOT 6,05 — 0,16 2,96 2,41 3,34 2,71
t-value 0,85 — 0,12 2,27 1,69 2,22 1,61
R2 0,157 — 0,193 0,172 0,162 0,179 0,120
N 2465 — 2464 2377 2197 2006 1820
D/Apre-IPO > 0,5
HOT 172,25 87,45 38,95 41,59 44,73 47,31 48,00
COLD 123,63 84,61 44,05 43,55 45,36 46,13 47,43
t-value (difference) 6,76 3,53 -4,17 -1,60 -0,47 0,86 0,37
HOT 23,07 — -4,31 -1,40 -1,75 -0,22 -0,12
t-value 3,82 — -4,02 -1,29 -1,45 -0,17 -0,08
R2 0,355 — 0,181 0,179 0,194 0,157 0,157
N 3966 — 3966 3843 3524 3206 2898
D/Apre-IPO < 0,5
HOT 162,90 31,22 25,97 30,41 30,41 36,38 37,11
COLD 102,77 30,95 28,54 28,98 28,98 33,23 37,60
t-value (difference) 4,33 0,19 -1,36 0,81 0,47 1,37 -0,18
HOT 33,07 — -1,96 0,75 -1,49 0,19 -1,48
t-value 1,92 — -1,08 0,36 -0,62 0,07 -0,51
R2 0,145 — 0,186 0,188 0,188 0,224 0,160
N 793 — 791 785 743 685 627
D/At
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6. Conclusions 
While there are many similarities between the samples concerning the differences between 
hot and cold market firms, I also find many differences between the samples.  
Hot market firms raise on average 51% more proceeds compared to IPO year-end assets and 
98% more compared to pre-IPO assets during 1971-1999. The corresponding figures for 2000-
2015 sample are 16% more and 39%. While hot markets firms still raise significantly more 
proceeds, the difference between hot and cold market firms has decreased. At the same time 
proceeds raised by both hot and cold market firms have increased significantly from the 1971-
1999 sample.  
Regression analysis shows that the pure market timing effect, defined by regression 
coefficient for market timing, during the 1971-199 sample is almost equal to the differences 
between hot and cold market proceeds. This is consistent with the findings of Alti (2006). 
However, when examining the subsample starting from 2000, I find that while the difference 
between hot and cold market proceeds is still significant, the effect of pure market timing has 
virtually no effect on the difference.  
Although, the difference between hot and cold markets proceeds decrease significantly from 
1971-1999 sample to 2000-2015 sample, there is still a significant difference in the amount 
of proceeds. Accordingly, hot market firms decrease their leverage more than cold market 
firms do.  
The difference between cumulative change in pre-IPO leverage is significantly different 
between hot and cold market firms for at least four years after the IPO for the 1971-1999 
sample. The 2000-2015 sample shows very little persistence of the effect which market timing 
has on capital structure. The difference of cumulative change from pre-IPO leverage is 
insignificant only a year after the IPO. I conclude that the persistence of market timings’ effect 
has decreased significantly from 1971-1999 sample to 2000-2015 sample. 
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